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SUMMARY 
 
This submission presents key findings to date from a critical examination of unemployment 
benefit sanctions and disallowances based primarily on statistical analysis. It shows that the 
severity of the regime has increased drastically under the Coalition and is increasing further.  
One fifth of JSA claimants have been sanctioned/disallowed, 4.2% per month of all claimants 
and 8% per month of those aged 18-24. Disallowances for ‘voluntary leaving’ and ‘losing a 
job through misconduct’ were previously a major component but have almost disappeared in 
the recession, with disallowances for (not) ‘actively seeking work’ showing a very big 
increase, and big increases also for non-participation in training (including the Work 
Programme) and non-compliance with a Jobseeker’s Direction. Severity is greater at times 
when it is least productive. A gap has been emerging in the treatment of white and minority 
ethnic groups, and disabled people are over-represented among repeat 
sanctions/disallowances. The reasons for these differences should be investigated. Although 
sanctions increase job search and exit from benefits, they cannot be justified when all their 
effects are considered. These include worse matches of people to jobs, lower productivity, 
wastefully large numbers of job applications, damage to health, families and relationships, 
homelessness, destitution as reflected in the rise of Food Banks, increased crime, diversion of 
Jobcentre resources from their proper role, and creation of a climate of fear and hostility 
which undermines the whole system. Sanctions, which are financial penalties intended to 
affect behaviour, should be abolished. Entitlement conditions have to be retained, but should 
be accompanied by a proper safety net for those disallowed, and an approach to influencing 
claimants, where justified, which is properly based on behavioural psychology, as pioneered 
by the Prime Minister’s ‘nudge unit’. 
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1. This submission addresses the second of the issues identified by the Committee: 
 
‘JCP’s role in relation to the rights and responsibilities of benefit claimants, including: 
the effectiveness of benefit conditionality, particularly job-seeking conditionality and 
the mandatory “work-focused interview”; and the level and appropriateness of JCP’s 
use of benefit sanctions, including differences of approach between JCP Districts.’ 
 
2. I have been researching unemployment for 20 years and my PhD by published work is 
available at http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1720. I am currently carrying out a critical examination of 
unemployment benefit sanctions and disallowances in Great Britain, based primarily on a 
statistical analysis going back as far as records will allow. The work is not complete, but I am 
keen for the Committee to have the benefit of key findings to date. 
 
Disallowances and Sanctions  
 
3. Much current discussion is losing sight of the distinction between ‘disallowances’ and 
‘sanctions’. For instance, the Opposition spokesman Liam Byrne stated on 19 March (col. 
834) that ‘the general legal power of the DWP to issue sanctions…..is a broad sui generis 
power that has been in place since 1911’.  This is a misconception. 
 
4. Although few JSA claimants (11.9%) currently have a contribution-based entitlement, the 
system remains an insurance scheme. As for any such scheme, various conditions have 
applied to unemployment benefit since its introduction in 1911; these were strictly defined in 
the original Act and in no way constituted a ‘general legal power’ (Tillyard 1949). 
Disallowance because a condition is not met is different from a ‘sanction’. In relation to 
unemployment benefits, ’sanctions’ on any scale date only from the 1980s and stem from the 
belief that unemployed people should be ‘activated’.1  ‘Sanctions’ are penalties intended to 
make claimants do particular things, such as apply for specified numbers of jobs per week.  
They are about ‘changing behaviour’, not entitlement. 
 
5. Loss of this distinction confuses the issues and is unnecessarily stigmatising to 
unemployed people. For instance, to give up a job is not any kind of offence. We do not have 
serfdom in the UK. However, there is a potential ‘moral hazard’ if unemployment benefit can 
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be claimed immediately. Therefore, a disallowance to unemployment benefit has always 
applied to ‘voluntary leaving’, of up to 6 weeks from 1911 to 1986, and now 13 weeks on the 
first occasion. Yet we find the Explanatory Memorandum to the Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(Sanctions) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 talking of ‘categories of sanctionable failure’ 
and ‘three categories of sanction……..The first situation is when claimants fail to comply 
with the most important jobseeking requirements, these (include)…..without good reason - 
voluntarily leaving employment’. Similar confusions are contained in the new Regulations 
themselves.  
 
The level of JSA Sanctions and Disallowances 
 
6. There is a common misconception that sanctions and disallowances affect only a small 
minority of claimants.2 In fact one fifth (19%) of all JSA claimants over the five years April 
2007 to March 2012 were subject to sanctions or disallowances. That is 1,483,760 people.3  
Referrals are around double the number of adverse decisions, so some 3 million people will 
have been threatened. There were 778,000 sanctions or disallowances in the year to October 
2012. Under the Coalition, the monthly rate of sanctions has been 4.2% of all JSA claimants. 
For JSA claimants aged 18-24 the rate is 8% per month; this is 1 in 200 of the entire 18-24 
population age group each month. 
 
7. Figure 1 shows total referrals and adverse decisions from April 2000 to October 2012, 
while Figure 2 plots adverse decisions against the claimant unemployment rate.4 All the 
charts in this submission show figures as a percentage of JSA claimants since in order to see 
the severity of the regime it is necessary to take out the effect of changing volumes of 
unemployment.  
 
8. The low point was 2005; thereafter there was a rise when John Hutton was secretary of 
state, and then some fluctuations before a further rise under the Coalition. Some recent 
fluctuations have been due to the handover in summer 2011 to private contractors of 
responsibility for initiating Work Programme sanctions, and to the ‘stockpiling’ of some 
sanctions following the Reilly-Wilson judgment in August 2012; otherwise, the Coalition’s 
figures would be higher.  
 
9. The above figures do not include any sanctions under the new, more severe, Regulations 
applying from 22 October 2012. The DWP promised to publish figures for 22 October 2012 
to 31 January 2013 on 15 May 2013. This publication did not take place, because of 
‘significant doubts around the quality of the statistics’.5  However, the DWP 'score card' 
(Guardian, 28 March) implied a big further rise in sanctions/disallowances in December and 
January, to over 7% per month. This is shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Reasons for sanction/disallowance 
 
10. Figure 3 shows the main reasons for sanction/disallowance in 2004 and in the year to 
October 2012. Failure to attend an advisory interview is the most frequently occurring reason, 
though its relative importance has fallen a little. By contrast there has been a huge fall in the 
numbers of people disentitled for leaving a job voluntarily or losing it through misconduct. 
Figure 4 shows that this is due to the current recession. People hold on to a job more 
carefully when it is harder to get another; the same phenomenon was observed in previous 
decades.6 Since voluntary leaving/misconduct accounted for over a quarter of all 
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sanctions/disallowances in 2004, the increases in the other categories have been 
correspondingly greater.  
 
11. Figure 5 shows that ‘Actively seeking work’ accounts for much the biggest share of the 
increase in sanctions/disentitlements since 2004.  This entitlement condition relates to the 
definition of unemployment: to be unemployed you must be looking for work. It was 
introduced in May 1919 and its administration produced major controversy in the later 1920s, 
leading to its abolition in March 1930 following a Labour Party backbench revolt.7  It was 
reintroduced in 1989 but had little impact until the introduction of JSA in 1996. It then died 
away until John Hutton, under whom the proportion of referrals resulting in disentitlement 
rose from around 60% to around 80% (Figure 6). Under the Coalition it has had a spectacular 
further increase.8 
 
12. Also seeing a big rise since 2004 are sanctions for non-participation in training and 
employment programmes (other than S.17A Back to Work schemes but including the Work 
Programme) (Figure 7). Sanctions for refusing a Jobseeker’s Direction have tripled in the 
latest year, from a low base. 
 
13. Passing of the retrospective Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act in March 2013 will 
have rapidly increased the number of S.17A sanctions, but these do not yet show in the 
figures.  
 
Variation of sanctions/disallowances in relation to unemployment over time and by 
geography 
 
14. It is clear that any effect of sanctions/disallowances on the level of unemployment over 
time is very minor (Figure 2). The big changes in unemployment are due to macro-economic 
factors. It is also striking that sanctions/disallowances have increased so much when 
unemployment is high. Rational policy would dictate the opposite. There is no point putting 
more pressure on claimants when there are fewer jobs. Unemployment was 2.52 million in 
January-March 2013, while the ONS vacancy survey estimated an average 0.503m unfilled 
vacancies February-April 2013.9  Moreover, there are now twice as many JSA claimants as 
there were in 2004.  The extra claimants (barring the additional 140,000 lone parents and 
some transferred from IB/ESA, who have their own issues) are people who would not 
normally be out of work and by no stretch of the imagination should need sanctioning. 
 
15. The Guardian on 18 April 2011 published an analysis showing that areas with higher 
unemployment tend to have higher rates of fixed length sanctions. Further analysis of my 
own contained in a supplementary submission to the Committee dated 8 August 2013 
confirms that claimants in areas of higher unemployment are more likely to be penalised for 
non-attendance or lateness at interviews, and for non-participation in training or employment 
schemes. By contrast, penalties for voluntary leaving, misconduct, ‘neglect to avail’ of an 
opportunity and refusal of a job are less frequent in areas of high unemployment. Figure 8 
shows the relationship for advisory interviews across regions.10  
 
Ethnic and disability monitoring 
 
16. Peters & Joyce (2006) using data for 2004 reported that there was no difference in 
treatment of different ethnic groups. However, a considerable gap has been emerging since 
2005 in the treatment of white and minority ethnic claimants (Figures 9 to 11).11 This is not 
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necessarily due to discrimination. It could be due to an emerging difference in the occurrence 
of some characteristic which is positively correlated with sanction/disallowance. It is not due 
to the changing age or sex composition of the different ethnic groups. These have been such 
as to imply fewer sanctions/disallowances for the minorities. DWP should be asked to explain 
the emerging difference and to state whether it can be justified. 
 
17. Potential discrimination against the disabled cannot currently be monitored and DWP 
should be requested to add the necessary data to the Tabtool. But there is a higher proportion 
of disabled people among those subject to repeat sanctions (Figure 12). This is of particular 
concern because of the new 3-year sanctions for repeated non-compliance.  
 
Reconsiderations and Appeals 
 
18. The appeals system does not appear effective. In April 2000 to April 2012 inclusive, only 
17% of those subject to sanction/disallowance asked for reconsideration, of whom 53% were 
successful. Only 2% appealed to a tribunal, of whom 17% were successful. Given claimants’ 
high success rate at reconsideration, it appears that not nearly enough ask for this. Peters & 
Joyce (2006) found that claimants saw the process as long and futile, feared a lack of support, 
or could not afford phone calls/stamps/fares. Tribunals play scarcely any role, and with the 
removal of legal aid from April 2013 are likely to play even less. 
 
Can sanctions be justified? 
 
19. There is plenty of evidence that sanctions increase job search and exit from 
unemployment benefit (e.g. Abbring et al. 200512). However a policy has to be justified in 
terms of its overall effects.  
 
20. Much of the belief in the use of sanctions to support ‘activation’ arises from ‘supply-side’ 
economic theories of the labour market which have been shown to be ill-informed and 
mistaken (Turok & Webster 1998, Webster 2000, 2005). 
  
21. So far as I can establish, none of the economists who have shown that sanctions increase 
unemployment exit have examined whether this actually raises aggregate employment, or 
whether their findings apply both in and out of recessions. The Rayner Review (DE/DHSS 
1981, para. 4.65 (1)), writing in the depths of an earlier recession, commented ‘a job filled by 
one unemployed person will usually result in there being one fewer job for another 
unemployed person’. This is equally true now. Moreover, forced matches between applicant 
and job will be worse, reducing economic efficiency. Petrongolo (2009) and Arni et al. 
(2012) both found that sanctions push people into worse jobs, with lasting ill-effects. This fits 
with Chetty’s (2008) finding that people with resources take longer to find a job, indicating 
that choosiness pays off.  If it pays off for the individual, so it will for the economy – and 
Acemoglu & Shimer (1999, 2000) accordingly find that unemployment insurance increases 
output and productivity. 
 
22. Additional job search and applications have costs, for both claimants and employers. 
Patacchini & Zenou (2006) found that left to themselves, people search more when labour 
demand and incomes are higher. This makes sense, as the returns to search will then be 
greater. In current conditions, sanctions induce greater than optimal job search, for both 
claimants and employers. Far too many applications are being made. Employers are receiving 
45 applications for each low-skilled job, but only half of the applicants are suitable.13 
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23. Sanctions have many other damaging effects. They damage health, and family and friends 
suffer hardship and damaged relationships (Peters & Joyce 2006, Vincent 1998, Saunders et 
al. 2001, Dorsett et al. 2011); they contribute to homelessness.14 Their financial impact is 
very variable, depending on the claimant’s family circumstances and other resources. 
However, they account for a quarter of users of Food Banks in Scotland.15  Not surprisingly 
therefore, Machin and Marie (2006) showed (for the UK) that sanctions increase crime.16 
 
24. Much evidence has reached the media recently of increasing numbers of unfair 
sanctions/disallowances and of pressure on Jobcentre staff to increase them against their 
better judgment.17 Even when the regime was at its mildest in 2004, two-fifths of those with a 
sanction/disallowance thought it unfair, while 23% thought it could not have been avoided 
and another 21% were unsure how it could have been (Peters & Joyce 2006).18 Nor is this 
new; Bryson & Jacobs (1992) quoted many examples of claimants unfairly or dishonestly 
sanctioned/disallowed.19 Such sanctioning activity involves a big diversion of Jobcentre staff 
effort away from their primary tasks of nurturing the labour force and improving the 
efficiency of the labour market.  The resulting climate of fear and hostility undermines 
support work; makes claimants reluctant to complain about malpractice by officials, 
contractors or employers; and undermines the usefulness and acceptability of national 
insurance for everyone.20  
 
Sanctions should be abolished 
 
25. The evidence strongly suggests that sanctions (as opposed to disallowances) should be 
abolished, with a return to the regime of insurance conditions originally envisaged in 1911, 
supplemented by a proper safety net for those who do not meet them. In so far as it is 
desirable to attempt to influence claimants’ behaviour – and given the record of frequently 
wrong-headed pressure such attempts need to be carefully justified – then this should be done 
through a scientific approach.  
 
26. It appears that as the desire within government to ‘activate’ unemployed people grew, no 
one actually considered what might be the best way to do it; by a simple process of inertia, 
the loss of benefits logically entailed by the quite different issue of entitlement was 
uncritically transferred across to sanctions. In this connection the Prime Minister’s ‘nudge’ 
unit21 is to be congratulated on persuading the DWP to co-operate in experiments in two 
areas, Essex and the North East, to use behavioural psychology in a constructive way to 
develop claimants’ confidence.22  The claimants in the Essex trial were about 17.5% more 
likely to be off benefits after 13 weeks. It is most regrettable that the Opposition spokesman, 
Liam Byrne, dismissed both these trials, the latter as ‘mumbo-jumbo’. On the contrary, use of 
behavioural psychology to inform attempts to influence behaviour is extremely valuable and 
should have been done long before. 
 
27. Supporting this approach, Lalive et al. (2005) found that warnings without sanctions, and 
simple monitoring of job search, were effective in influencing exit from unemployment. 
McVicar (2010) found the same for monitoring. Ironically, one of the ministers promoting 
the current intensification of sanctions, David Freud, has himself previously supported this 
view (2007, p.95): ‘Perhaps a formal process which kicks off with a written warning, 
followed by a formal interview, would have more impact than any actual financial 
repercussions’.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
Adverse decision = A decision on a referral which is adverse to the claimant and results in a 
sanction or disallowance being imposed 
 
BtW = ‘Back to Work’ scheme 
 
FTA = ‘Failure to attend’ 
 
MWA = Mandatory Work Activity 
 
NOMIS = The National Online Manpower Information System, http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/ 
 
NTA = ‘Neglect to avail’ of an opportunity of employment or training 
 
Referral = Referral of a JSA claim by DWP staff to a Decision Maker to decide whether a 
sanction or disallowance should be imposed 
 
 
 
 
NOTE ON THE STATISTICS 
 
Data on sanctions and disallowances in the Figures are either from the DWP web Tabtool 
(April 2000 onwards) or from the volumes of Adjudication Officers’ Decisions previously 
published by the Employment Service or its predecessors. My work on the latter source is not 
yet complete as it has been very difficult to assemble a complete series.  
 
In both sets of statistics, nothing is recorded on a referral until there is a decision. The 
Tabtool attributes each decision to the month of original referral, and shows the latest status 
of each referral. Figures from the earlier sources attribute each case to the month of the 
original decision, and do not show any subsequent revision. The Adjudication Officer series 
does give revisions, but not in such a way that they can be attributed to any particular 
previous decision. 
 
The ‘year to October 2012’ is actually a little less than a year because figures for October run 
only to the 21st of the month. This gives a slight downward bias to the sanctions/disallowance 
figures. 
 
Data on numbers of and characteristics of JSA claimants are either from the DWP Tabtool or 
from NOMIS. Population data are from NOMIS. The claimant unemployment rate shown in 
Figures 2 and 8 is the number of JSA claimants as a percentage of the resident working age 
population (this yields quite low figures). Other unemployment rates use the official ILO 
definition; these are sometimes shown divided or multiplied by 10 simply in order to fit them 
conveniently to the chart. 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 10
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Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
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1 There were some small-scale uses of what would now be called ‘sanctions’, i.e. financial penalties aimed at 
making claimants do a particular thing, from 1930, although they were called ‘disqualifications’. The term 
‘sanction’ was not used until much later.  
2 For instance, the Minister of State said on 19 March (col. 828) that ‘While the vast majority of jobseekers live 
up to their part of the contract, there are a small minority (emphasis added) who are reluctant to do 
everything they can reasonably be expected to do to get back into work.’   
3 DWP FoI Response 2012-4383, 21 December 2012 
4 The claimant unemployment rate is used in this chart simply because it fits better. The claimant rate, while 
much lower than the true ILO unemployment rate, is very highly correlated with it. 
5 http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/news_and_announcements/2013/jsa_sanctions.pdf 
6 The percentage of male claimants refused UB because of voluntary leaving or misconduct fell from 6.1 in 
November 1974 to 0.3 in February 1982 (Department of Health & Social Security, Unemployment Benefit 
Summary Statistics, November 1983, p.3). Fenn (1980, p.251) concluded from his study of unemployment 
benefit disqualifications covering Great Britain in 1960 to 1976 that ‘employees appear to quit more often in 
periods of high demand for labour’.  Also, the Ministry of Labour’s Annual Reports showed the number of 
disqualifications by Courts of Referees for voluntary leaving or misconduct more than doubling during the 
recovery from the Great Depression from a low of 99,053 in 1932 to 203,298 in 1938. 
7 Deacon (1976) 
8 Although ‘Actively seeking work’ is an entitlement condition, it has in effect been turned into a sanction issue 
because claimants are made to make and document arbitrarily large numbers of job applications. To be 
unemployed on the ILO definition it is necessary only to have taken an action to look for work in the last 4 
weeks. 
9 DWP Press Release, 15 May 2013 
10 At the time of writing the Guardian spreadsheet was still available at 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdGNkUEg4czNtdUlsWkJuWWtteGJqZmc&hl=en
#gid=0 
11 The DWP Tabtool gives ethnic group and disability status for those sanctioned/disallowed, but not for all JSA 
claimants. This information can be obtained for ethnic group from May 2005 onwards from NOMIS, but not for 
disability. 
12 Observers do not appear to have noticed that the Netherlands sanctions regime described by Abbring et al. 
(2005) was much milder than the UK regime, even before the changes of October 2012. Yet it was apparently 
‘effective’ in the terms defined by those authors. 
13 Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development-Success Factors, Labour Market Outlook, Spring 2013, 
p.2. Bryson & Jacobs (1992) commented as follows (p.158): ‘It is sometimes regarded as self-evident that 
claimants’ requirement to seek out vacancies benefits employers in filling vacancies. This view was not 
supported by employers…..There was some irritation expressed at the number of jobcentre applications 
received from unsuitable candidates, one or two saying that they felt like they were running their own 
jobcentre’ and (p.199) ‘there were concerns that benefit penalties compounded employers’ difficulties in 
weeding out unsuitable candidates’.  I have not found any more recent research on this point. 
14 Citizens Advice Bureau, Conditionality and sanctions in the Welfare Reform Bill, n.d., pp. 2-3 (on web, 
accessed 22/5/2013) 
15 Citizens Advice Bureau survey, reported in the Glasgow Herald, 25 March 2013. See also Citizens Advice 
Scotland (2012b) 
16 See also the case history in Saunders et al. (2001, p.38) 
17 This evidence has appeared particularly in the Guardian (search Google on ‘Guardian sanctions’) but also for 
instance in the Glasgow Herald, Stephen Naysmith, ‘Scots jobless “targeted with benefit penalties”, 29 March 
2013, and very widely on the web in postings which are too numerous to list. See also Citizens Advice Scotland 
(2012a), p.3, (2012c) passim and (2013) p.6.  I have also had many personal accounts given to me, usually at 
reliable second hand. 
18 Vincent (1998) found that ‘nearly all’ those sanctioned or disallowed thought it unfair. 
19 Bryson & Jacobs (1992), particularly pp. 81-87, 91, 104, 110-12.  
24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Neil Couling, the DWP’s Work Services Director, has recently drawn attention to the hostility created by 
sanctions (Couling 2013, para. 3.14): ‘One unintended consequence of the publicity about these issues (i.e. 
sanctions ‘league tables’ etc.) has been to raise some additional health and safety questions in jobcentres.  The 
applications of sanctions and conditionality already generates a significant number of incidents and there is a 
strong likelihood that this media attention and comment in Parliament will serve to exacerbate these risks’. 
21 The ‘nudge unit’ is officially known as the Behavioural Insights Team, overseen by the Cabinet Office. 
22 http://blogs.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/behavioural-insights-team/2012/12/14/new-bit-trial-results-helping-
people-back-into-work/;  http://blogs.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/behavioural-insights-team/2013/04/08/bit-back-
to-work-trial-covered-by-bbc-pm/  For Essex see Daniel Boffey, ‘Writing exercises help jobseekers find work, 
claims government's nudge unit’, Observer, 29 December 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/dec/30/jobseekers-dole-nudge-unit-psychology; Oliver Wright, ‘Job 
seekers get a nudge in planning to find work’, Independent, 8 March 2013, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/job-seekers-get-a-nudge-in-planning-to-find-work-
8527271.html; Hannah Kuchler, ‘Jobcentres try ‘nudging’ the workless’, Financial Times, 20 March 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4a5dbfee-8806-11e2-8e3c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TyE2P5l9. For the North 
East see 'Mumbo-jumbo' personality tests for jobseekers criticised by Labour’, BBC News, 30 April 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22356754.  
